Voluntary Offer Agreement Iaea
In addition to strengthening safeguards through the adoption of the Additional Protocol model in the late 1990s and 2000s, the IAEA has also developed methods to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of implementing safeguards for states where CSAs and APS are in force. The IAEA has launched a “state-level approach” to assess state compliance with protection agreements in a comprehensive manner and not on the basis of a facility of establishment. It has also begun to adopt “broader conclusions” for states in order to facilitate the burden of implementation by applying the approach at the national level. The five nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have entered into voluntary agreements on supply guarantees under which the IAEA applies safeguards for nuclear materials in facilities that the State has voluntarily proposed and has chosen the IAEA for the application of security measures. The IAEA applies safeguards as part of a voluntary offer agreement to ensure that nuclear materials remain in peaceful activities and are not removed from security measures, unless provided for in the agreement. Safeguards are being implemented in three non-NPT states – India, Pakistan and Israel – on the basis of one-off agreements with the IAEA. As part of these agreements, the IAEA implements security measures to ensure that nuclear materials, facilities and other objects defined under the safeguard agreement are not used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or military promotion, and that these objects are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. In 2005, the IAEA Governing Council decided that small quantity protocols would remain available with revised standard text to be used for future small quantity protocols, and asked states with original protocols for small quantities to adopt the revised small quantity protocol as soon as possible. The revised Small Quantity Protocol reduces the number of provisions of the Generalized Safeguards Agreement held in Derabe and the main provisions relating to the notification of nuclear materials and the execution of inspections are effective. Iraq, a state part of the NPT, has successfully circumvented the IAEA`s protection measures by using the Agency`s system to limit its inspection and monitoring activities to facilities or equipment expressly stated by each state in its guarantee agreement with the Agency. To fill the gap in “undeclared facilities,” the IAEA has launched a safety improvement plan known as the “93-2 program.” The name of the plan reflected that it was designed in 1993 with the intention of being implemented in two years. All non-nuclear-weapon States belonging to the NPT, as well as States parties to regional treaties establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, are required to enter into comprehensive protection agreements with the IAEA.